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In everyday life, we usually demand explanations only of  unexpected 
events. Thus, when I come home from work and find my family at home, 
I do not ask why they are there. I would ask for an explanation if I found 
my family absent and the house occupied by strangers. We do not ask 
why the streets are crowded at 5 PM. We would be inclined to ask for 
an explanation if we saw a traffic jam at 5 AM. An explanation would 
satisfy us if we were told of  an event as a consequence of which we would 
expect to find heavy traffic at 5 AM. In other words, the acceptance of  
an explanation of an event depends on our comparing two estimated 
likelihoods, namely the a priori and the a posteriori probability of the 
event in question. 
In mathematical information theory, this comparison is made precise, 
and defines the quantity of information in a message. Suppose the a priori 
probability of an event (that is, the probability before the message was 
sent) is p(E), and the a posteriori probability (after the message is received) 
is p(E/m). That is to say, p(E/m) is the conditional probability of  E, given 
the receipt of  the message. Then the amount  of information about the 
event contained in the message is defined (in bits) as 
I (E;m) _= log 2 - -  
p(E/m) 
p(E) 
This quantity may be positive, zero, or negative; and it is instructive 
to examine the respective conditions. It is positive if p (El m) > p (E); that 
is, if  the a priori probability of the event is smaller than the a posteriori 
probability. Indeed, the amount of  information increases (though not 
proportionately) with the ratio p (E  I m) / p(E). Suppose, for example, we 
think it is unlikely that a legislator will vote for a certain measure. Sup- 
pose, further, that we learn about certain business connections of  his, 
and as a result of  this knowledge we make a larger estimate of  the likeli- 
hood that he will vote for the measure. Then if he does vote for the 
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measure, we have received a positive amount of information about the 
way he will vote when we have learned about his connections. 
The amount  of  information about an event in the message is zero if 
P(Elm) = p ( E ) ,  for in that case the ratio equals 1, and log21 =0 .  For 
example, if we are told that the legislator voted for the measure because 
the vote was called on a Tuesday, and if we fail to see the relevance of  
this circumstance, we have received no (explanatory) information. In this 
case, the a posteriori probability of the event was not increased as a con- 
sequence of  the message. 
The amount of information about an event may also be negative. This 
happens if the a posteriori probability of  the event decreases with the 
receipt of the message. This would be the case, for example, if we were 
told that the passage of the measure would be against the interests of  the 
legislator. If  he voted for the measure nevertheless, we have received a 
negative amount  of information about 'his reason for doing so'. It is im- 
portant to keep in mind that this amount depends on both the a priori 
and on the a posteriori probability of  the event. Hence, if the a priori 
probability is already large, not much information can be given in a mes- 
sage to increase it. 
The explanatory power of a hypothesis or a theory can be conveniently 
related to the above mentioned definition of  information. The greater the 
increase in the a posteriori probability of an event (given the assumptions 
embodied in the theory) relative to the a priori probability, the greater 
the explanatory power of  the theory. 
The so-called hypothetico-deductive method of the mathematicized sci- 
ences illustrates this principle. A mathematical theory is essentially a 
device for deducing (by mathematical reasoning) the consequences of  
certain assumptions. These consequences are generally expressed in quan- 
titative relations. In the ideal case, the deduced mathematical expression 
predicts the observation of some magnitudes; for example, in astronomy 
the time of  occurrence of the next several solar eclipses. Now, the a priori 
probability that an eclipse will occur at any particular time, is, of  course 
very small. This can be directly tested by asking people ignorant of astro- 
nomy to guess when the next eclipse will occur. Accurate guesses will be 
rare indeed. The a posteriori probability of  a definitive prediction is, on 
the contrary, equal to 1. (If  we believe the prediction, we are, by definition, 
certain that the event will occur.) Therefore the discrepancy between the 
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a priori and the a posteriori probabilities is very large, and this is the 
meaning of the assertion that the newtonian theory of celestial mechanics 
(on the basis of which the prediction is made) is a powerful theory. 
To take an example of the opposite kind, consider the 'theory' which 
explains the principles of finding underground water by means of the 
divining rod. The water-diviner is successful about 70~  of the time. This 
looks like a pretty good score. But to estimate the power of the theory, 
this score is not enough. We must also know the a priori probability of 
finding water in an arbitrarily selected location. Some years ago skeptics 
took the trouble to find out. They selected a large number of sites at 
random, and found water in about seven cases out of ten. Consequently, 
the a priori and the a posteriori probabilities of finding water turned out 
to be equal, and the amount of information in the diviner's message 
('Here be water'), hence the explanatory power of his theory, turned out 
to be zero. 
In short, a theory is the more powerful the more successfully it predicts 
and the less probable (a priori) is the event predicted. We feel this intuiti- 
vely when we accept an explanation. We find the explanation most satis- 
fying when an event, which we had thought baffling, becomes self-evident 
after the explanation. This feeling is called the 'Aha!' phenomenon. 
This conception of explanatory power is attractive, because it is both 
intuitively acceptable and rigorous. However, care must be exercised in 
the way the definition is applied. Suppose, for example, we ask for an 
explanation of the seasons and get the usual one referring to the incli- 
nation of the earth's axis, etc. I f  we apply our criterion 'mechanically,' 
we may be led astray. For, although the variation of seasons follows from 
the explanation, i.e., acquires a posteriori probability equal to 1, the a 
priori probability of, say, spring following winter is also 1 (since spring is 
a regularly occurring event). According to our criterion, therefore, the 
usual explanation of seasonal variation seems to have no power at all. 
This conclusion is not warranted because we did not consider the entire 
range of events consistent with the explanation. This inclination of the 
earth's axis explains not only the seasons but also the apparent path of 
the sun among the stars. It also predicts the result of an experiment where 
a sphere revolves on an inclined axis around a source of heat, demonstra- 
ting the relation between the inclination of the axis and the amount of 
heat absorbed as a function of the angular distance from the poles. Hence 
324 ANATOL RAPOPORT 
the theory explains also the climatic zones. Therefore it is not necessarily 
the predictive power of a theory in a single instance which makes the 
theory acceptable, but rather its 'integrative potential', the extent to which 
many apparently unrelated events are seen in the light of the theory to 
be related. We shall call this aspect of a theory its explanatory appeal. 
Note that both explanatory power and explanatory appeal have to do 
with the degree to which, in the light of the theory, unexpected events 
become expected ones. The two criteria differ in that explanatory power 
can be made an objective criterion if the a priori and the a posteriori 
probabilities of an event can be objectively estimated. Explanatory ap- 
peal, on the other hand, remains a subjective criterion, rooted in the 
feeling we have that we have 'understood' an event. 
Explanatory power and explanatory appeal are valued in different de- 
grees by people with different epistemological outlooks. Specifically, log- 
ical positivists and 'hard' scientists put a value only on explanatory power. 
Social scientists of the humanist persuasion, on the other hand, place 
much more value on explanatory appeal. Myths and superstitions are 
essentially theories devoid of explanatory power but with explanatory 
appeal in the cultural settings where they occur. To avoid misconception, 
I should like to emphasize that the coincidence of the criteria used in 
accepting theories by the humanist social scientists and by the supersti- 
tious and naive in no way puts the former in the category of the latter, 
nor the latter in the category of the former. 
A superstition is an imagined causal link between events, for example, 
between seeing a black cat cross one's path and a mishap. One who be- 
lieves in the link 'expects' the mishaps in the sense that he is not surprised 
when they occur. In his estimation, therefore, the probability of a mishap 
increases following the encounter with a black cat. The formal criterion 
of 'explanatory power' seems to be satisfied by the superstition. However, 
the explanatory power of this 'theory' is illusory, as can be demonstrated 
by comparing the estimated probabilities of mishaps following and not 
following encounters with black cats with the actual frequencies of such 
mishaps. 
Myths are essentially analogies. Thunder used to be explained by the 
peasants of Eastern Europe as the rumbling of Elijah's chariot, because 
the sound resembled the noise made by wagons on bumpy roads. In this 
way a connection was established (in the minds of the peasants) between 
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a mysterious phenomenon and a familiar one. Political myths serve a 
similar purpose. When industrial setbacks in Stalin's Russia were ex- 
plained in terms of sabotage by traitors and foreign agents, bewildering 
or threatening events were reduced to 'expected ones'. The same purpose 
is achieved when our Secretary of State explains social upheavals in im- 
poverished countries in terms of a world communist conspiracy. Once 
the explanation is accepted, when an event of that sort occurs, one can say 
to oneself, 'Of course! There it is again.' The familiarity of the presumed 
cause (because it was given a name) obviates the necessity to search 
further. 
The explanatory appeal of naming is rooted in the cognitive function 
of language. We read in Genesis ".. .and whatsoever the man would call 
every living creature, that was to be the name thereof." The new-born 
man is shown acquiring 'knowledge' about the world he was put in by 
simply naming the things around him. This conception of knowledge was 
satirized by Moli~re in Le Malade Imaginaire, where a physician explains 
that opium puts people to sleep 'because of its dormative property'. It 
is embodied in word magic to the extent that among some people know- 
ledge of a person's name is believed to confer power over that person. 
Strictly speaking, knowledge of names confers no predictive power. The 
reason naming has explanatory appeal is that it facilitates recognition, 
which is a transformation of something unexpected into something ex- 
pected. Classification (the naming of names) facilitates recognition still 
further. For this reason, theories which are little more than systems of 
classification (hence devoid of explanatory power in the sense here de- 
fined) often have great explanatory appeal. We feel we understand the 
world if we can put our experiences into proper pigeon holes. 
In the disciplines where I come from (mathematics and mathematicized 
sciences), a system of classification is not considered to be a theory. Naming 
and classification (i.e., defining terms) is seen at most as laying a ground- 
work for a theory, creating a language in which to develop the logical 
structure of a theory. As for the theory itself, the meaning of the term 
in the 'hard' sciences derives from its etymology. A theory is a collection 
of theorems, assertions derived from postulates by mathematical deduc- 
tion. The truth of a theory is contained entirely in its predictive power, 
i.e., to the extent to which the derived assertions are verified by obser- 
vations. 
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Critics of the social sciences, especially those of logical positivist per- 
suasion, are wont to demand that 'theory' in the social sciences should 
have the same meaning. In my opinion, this is impractical for two reasons. 
First, theories with genuine explanatory (i.e., predictive) power are hard 
to come by in the present stage of the social sciences. Hence, if theories 
with predictive power are demanded of the social scientist, and he cannot 
produce them, he may turn away from theory altogether. An anti-theore- 
tical attitude inhibits the development of a science. Second, naming and 
classification in the social sciences have much more far-reaching conse- 
quences than in the 'hard' sciences. Therefore systems of classification, 
so-called concept-generating theories, which pervade the social sciences 
and which are valued mainly for their explanatory appeal cannot be sum- 
marily dismissed, as they would be in the context of a 'hard' science. At 
the same time, reliance on theories characterized by only explanatory 
appeal is fraught with serious danger. 
We shall return to this point. For the moment let us take a closer look 
at theories with explanatory power, as they have been developed in the 
'hard' experimental sciences where the hypothetico-deductive method has 
come fully into play. Here the conditions under which observations are 
made are manipulated (in controlled experiments). The sciences which 
make use of controlled experiments are the 'hardest' because they offer 
the opportunity of predicting events never before observed; that is, events 
with very small a priori probabilities of occurence. Note that according 
to this definition, celestial mechanics is a science of this sort. This may 
seem strange at first thought, since the heavenly bodies cannot be mani- 
pulated. However, the instruments of observation can. Thus the discovery 
of Neptune, following its prediction on the basis of calculations, was, in 
effect, a controlled experiment. The 'experimental set-up' was the aiming 
of the Berlin Observatory telescope at the point in the sky indicated by 
the calculations. The outcome of the experiment might have been 'planet 
observed' or 'no planet observed'. Since the a priori probability of the 
positive result was extremely small, and the prediction was definitive, the 
result established the truly astonishing explanatory power of the new- 
tonian theory. 
Repeated successes of a theory with high explanatory power eventually 
endow it with explanatory appeal, even if the theory lacked such appeal 
when it was first proposed. Usually this happens as a consequence of a 
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conceptual reorganization, a replacement of one framework of thought 
with another. Newtonian celestial mechanics at first lacked explanatory 
appeal, because the idea that a force (gravity) could act across 'empty 
space' was foreign to experience. People were accustomed to think of a 
'force' exerted by one body on another only when the bodies were in 
contact. However, the explanatory power of newtonian mechanics was so 
great that eventually physicists accepted the notion of action at a distance 
in their conceptual scheme, and the theory acquired also explanatory 
appeal. There were several instances of this sort. Clerk Maxwell's equa- 
tions governing the propagation of electro-magnetic waves had explana- 
tory power but lacked explanatory appeal, because physicists were accus- 
tomed to explain phenomena by 'mechanical models'. Maxwell attempted 
for a long time (in vain) to 'explain' his equations in terms of a mechanical 
model. Eventually the conceptual framework of the physicists was enlarged, 
and the need to 'understand' all physical phenomena in terms of mecha- 
nical models was dissipated. Again, physicists at first found it difficult 
to accept both relativity theory and quantum mechanics, the former be- 
cause it violated the intuitive notion that a time interval had an 'objective' 
meaning, that is, a value independent of the frame of reference of the 
observer; the latter because it violated the notion (derived from classical 
mathematical physics) that physical events obeyed deterministic laws of 
causality. However, the explanatory power of those theories forced a re- 
organization of basic concepts and they eventually lost their 'bizarre' 
character. In the new framework the events explained by the theories 
became 'understandable' as well as predictable. 
The phenomenal success of physical science has been attributed (justly, 
I believe) to the physicists' preference of explanatory power over explan- 
atory appeal as a criterion for accepting a theory. In the physical sciences 
verification of predictions is 'the final court of appeal,' as it were. Whenever 
the derived consequences of a theory result in predictions that consis- 
tently fail to be corroborated, the theory is modified or discarded. Thus 
a 'feedback circuit' is established between theory and experiment, between 
logical deduction and observed fact. The process propels theories toward 
greater generality and precision. When it becomes clear that even modifi- 
cations of existing theories will not eliminate the discrepancies, that is, 
when what is observed seems to violate the very logical structure of the 
entire conceptual scheme (the 'paradigm', as Thomas Kuhn called it), a 
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scientific revolution occurs: the paradigm is replaced by another. As a 
result, scientists acquire a new insight into the nature of their world, 
and a period of extremely rapid theoretical development is initiated. 
Because of this history of unqualified successes and (let's face it) be- 
cause science now enjoys unprecedented prestige as a source of power, 
there has been considerable longing among the social scientists to 'harden' 
social science, to make social science, like physical science, a source of 
genuine, progressive enlightenment or, in the thinking of some, a source 
of power. Thus there has been a transplantation into social science of the 
'hard' science paradigm - the hypothetico-deductive method. The funda- 
mental instrument of this approach is the model. Here a word of explana- 
tion is in order, because outside the physical sciences the term 'model' 
is used in two different ways. 
Sometimes 'model' is used to denote a representation that has only 
explanatory appeal. Such, for example, are the 'models of the mind' used 
by psychoanalysts. They are little more than diagrammatic representations 
of what are purported to be the components of the psyche; for example, 
the id, the ego, and the super-ego. Such 'models' are sometimes represented 
as areas with boundaries and arrows between them to indicate 'flow of 
energy' or of 'control'. These diagrams are essentially analogies or meta- 
phors. Their purpose is to induce certain mental images, so that if one 
thinks in terms of these images one gains an 'understanding' of how the 
psyche operates. Descriptive models of this sort are not confined to ab- 
struse matters. A model of the organizational structure of an institution 
may well represent components and relations which have counterparts in 
reality, for example, lines of authority and communication. A geographi- 
cal map is also a model in this sense. Such purely descriptive models help 
us visualize the object of investigation, either real or imagined. They have, 
however, no substantial predictive power. 
The models used in the 'hard' sciences are different. A model of this 
sort is essentially a set of assumptions. In particular, a mathematical model 
is a set of postulated relations among variables. From these assumptions 
other relations are deduced mathematically. The point of the matter is 
that, while it may be impossible to verify the original assumptions, it is 
possible to verify (or to refute) the consequences of these assumptions. 
For example, one model of population growth states that the rate of 
change of a population is a sum of two terms, one positively proportional 
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to the size of the population already attained (the Malthusian factor), the 
other negatively proportional to the square of the population (the crowd- 
ing factor). As stated, the assumption is difficult or impossible to verify. 
But the mathematical consequence of the assumption is that the growth 
of the population will follow a so-called logistic curve. This consequence 
can be easily tested, for example, in a bacterial culture. 
If  observations fail to corroborate the consequences, the model is there- 
by refuted. But if the consequences are corroborated, the model is not 
thereby 'proved' to be a representation of reality; it only acquires more 
credence. We can continue to use it, drawing additional consequences 
from it (if we can), thus putting it to more and more severe tests, perhaps 
modifying or generalizing it in the process. This is the 'feedback circuit' 
mentioned earlier. 
How are the assumptions chosen? They may be the result of 'operation- 
alizing' certain hypotheses already current. Usually hypotheses proposed 
by social scientists are not stated in a way that permits us to draw conse- 
quences which can be subjected to unambivalent empirical tests. The first 
task of the model builder is to re-state the hypothesis so that at least its 
derived consequences are testable. 
We shall examine two examples of mathematical models inspired by 
hypotheses about social behavior. The first was proposed by William 
Riker, the second by Lewis F. Richardson. Both seem pertinent to poli- 
tical science. 
The starting ('raw') hypothesis in the first model (Riker's) asserts that 
'in a political setting, people seek to increase their power'. As stated, the 
hypothesis cannot be subjected to an unambivalent test. Clearly, anecdotal 
material about individuals who acted thus and so, presumably in order 
to increase their power, will not do. We have no way of knowing whether 
the illustrative incidents were or were not selected because of their salience, 
no idea of how many counter-examples there may be, etc. In order to 
state the assertion as a testable hypothesis we need an operational defin- 
ition of power, actually a measure, because the assertion mentions 'increase 
of power'. An operational definition is one which describes operations to 
be performed on observables to determine what is defined. Many convinc- 
ing sounding definitions of power do not satisfy this criterion. For example, 
it has been suggested that the power which one individual wields over 
another is proportional to the probability with which the latter complies 
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with the demands of the former. Definitions of this sort are abundant in 
any textbook on a social science discipline. I am afraid that, in most of 
these statements, elegance of grammar is mistaken for precision. There 
is an unfortunate tendency among social scientists to engage in polemics 
about definitions, the arguments being based on the extent to which this 
or that definition captures the 'essentials' of the thing defined. For example, 
objections to the definition of power just mentioned may be made to the 
effect that it neglects the nature and the frequency of the demands. Speci- 
fically, the first party may be careful to demand only what he is reason- 
ably sure to get from the second party, and so the degree of compliance 
does not properly represent his 'power'. Again, the setting in which de- 
mands are made may not be one in which considerations of power are 
relevant. For example, a passenger may never have had a request refused 
by an airline hostess, but he would be foolhardy to conclude that he had 
complete power over airline hostesses, etc. 
The point I wish to make is that arguments of this sort are vacuous. 
Before we can say anything at all about the usefulness of the definition 
offered, we must have an idea of how to determine the key criterion, in 
this case the 'probability of compliance'. What is the universe of demands? 
Clearly, 'probability of compliance' (if it can ever be estimated) will vary 
widely from one setting to another even with the same two individuals. 
And even if such numbers were somehow computed, what is one to do with 
them? 
Any definition of power to be of service in a testable hypothesis must 
relate to a specific setting in which systematic observations can be made. 
There are such settings, for example, legislatures. In fact, legislatures lend 
themselves very well for the sort of observations that can be fitted into 
models with predictive content. They contain aggregates of individuals 
large enough to yield statistical indices (typically some hundreds), yet not 
too large to preclude examining the whole aggregate. Next, legislators 
engage in a formal procedure which can be reasonably interpreted as 
that of pitting the power of one group against that of another. Finally, 
accurate records of these activities are readily available. 
Now, there exists a strictly formalized model of conflict known as the 
mathematical theory of games. In particular, the branch of the theory 
dealing with 'games' involving more than two players (so-called N-person 
games) devotes much attention to the strategic aspects of coalition for- 
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mation. It must be stressed that 'strategy' in this context is completely 
stripped of all its content except what pertains to the exercise of power 
as defined in a specific context. For example, in legislatures the coalition 
which can pass or defeat a measure gives evidence that the coalition is at 
that time in possession of power. Here we can define a unit of power in 
its simplest context, namely what it takes to pass a measure. In other 
words, there is a 'unit of power' that the legislature as a whole possesses. 
The problem is to estimate how this unit is distributed among the mem- 
bers of the legislature. Note that the formal nature of the definition re- 
quires that the criteria of power distribution be equally formal. This means 
that only what is included in the definition of power should be included 
in the criterion of power distribution. 
A definition of the 'amount of power' accruing to a member of a legis- 
lature (or a coalition) has been proposed by L. S. Shapley in the context 
of N-person game theory. Suppose the voting units of a legislature have 
different 'weights'. This can be easily imagined if political parties vote in 
blocs: each bloc has a weight proportional to the number of votes in it. 
One way of defining the power of a bloc is as a number proportional to its 
weight. It turns out, however, that another somewhat more involved defi- 
nition captures more of what in politics is intuitively understood by 'power'. 
Assume that every issue is decided by a roll call vote, and that the order 
in which the members (or blocs) are called is random. Then every member 
(or bloc) has a certain chance of casting the decisive vote, that is, the vote 
which gives the majority to one or the other side of the issue. A member 
or a bloc in this position is called the pivot. For example, at the 1964 
Republican nominating convention, South Carolina was the pivot when 
her delegation cast the decisive vote for Goldwater. 
Naturally, the more votes a bloc has the greater the probability of its 
being a pivot; but this probability is not necessarily proportional to the 
number of votes. To illustrate, imagine a legislature with five blocs, having 
11, 6, 6, 5, and 3 votes respectively. If  a measure passes by majority vote, 
it is clear that the bloc with 3 votes can never be the pivot, since, in order 
for this to happen, some combination of blocs must have 13, 14, or 15 
votes, whereas no combination in the example cited has any of these. 
Therefore the bloc with 3 votes has no power at all in spite of the fact 
that it controls almost 10 ~ of the votes. 
An opposite situation is illustrated by a fictitious legislature (or a stock 
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company) where three blocs control 50, 49, and 1 vote respectively. It is 
easily verified that, in the six possible orders of voting, the 1 vote bloc 
is the pivot once, the 49 vote bloc once, and the 50 vote bloc four times. 
The distribution of power, then, according to Shapley's criterion is in 
proportion 4 - 1 - 1, which is not reflected in the number of votes. 
It is apparent that this definition of power is a generalization of the 
'swing vote' concept. Those who have the swing vote hold the 'balance of 
power', which in the case of three blocs makes itself felt especially 
strongly if the other two blocs always find themselves on opposite sides. 
Shapley's 'power' extends this notion to any number of blocs (or par- 
ties). 
Having thus established a precise operational definition of power, let 
us return to the original quasi-hypothesis, namely that in political con- 
texts people act so as to increase their power. We find that we can now 
turn the assertion into a genuine hypothesis if we can find a situation 
where people act so as to change the amount of power accruing to them. 
Such a situation presents itself in the French National Assembly, which 
William Riker studied with a view of testing the hypothesis. 
As is known, the French National Assembly consists of several voting 
blocs (parties). The power of each bloc can be calculated in the manner 
indicated. In the absence of data to the contrary, we assume that the power 
within each bloc is apportioned equally among its members. The circum- 
stance that makes the French National Assembly suitable for an investiga- 
tion of this sort is that migrations of members from one party to another 
are not infrequent. In Riker's study, 61 members of the Assembly changed 
their party affiliation. It is, of course, natural to postulate some ideologi- 
cal factors underlying such changes of party affiliation. However, the 
proposed hypothesis is silent on this matter. We are concerned only with 
the power (as defined by Shapley's index) that accrues to a member of the 
Assembly before and after he migrates from one party to another. I f  we 
calculate this change for the several migrations, will the average change be 
positive? Will it be statistically significant; i.e., will it be difficult to ascribe 
this result to chance alone? If  so, we have found a factor in the pheno- 
menon of party affiliation changes. 
From Riker's study it appears that the power of the migrators was not 
increased on the average by the migrations, and that consequently the 
hypothesis was not corroborated. However, it also turned out that the 
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migrators were predominantly those members who initially had less power 
(as here defined) than the average amount accruing to a member of the 
entire Assembly. It is therefore still possible to conjecture that an in- 
tuitive feeling of 'power deprivation' motivated the members to change 
party affiliation, although they did not on the average increase their power 
by migrating. 
Our next example will be Lewis F. Richardson's mathematical model 
of an arms race between two rival blocs. Again, the nature of the model 
demands that the situation examined be stripped of all content except 
what pertains directly to the variables singled out for study. 
The variables chosen by Richardson are 'amounts of hostility' which 
each of the blocs manifests toward the other. The ground rule in construct- 
ing mathematical models is that the variables (at least those to be used 
in the test of the model) be operationally defined. Therefore some index 
must be selected to justify an operational definition. Usually such selec- 
tion requires that we hold in abeyance all our misgivings about the 
'realism' of the index, that is, about whether it 'really' captures the essen- 
tials of what is defined. Richardson's indices of hostility are essentially the 
military budgets of the rival blocs. The model states that the rate of 
change of each budget is a sum of two terms, one positively proportional 
to the other's armament budget, the other negatively proportional to one's 
own. That is to say, each bloc is stimulated to increase its military budget 
by the level of the military budget of the other, while its own military 
budget serves as an inhibiting factor (either because of the economic 
burden or because the threat is seen in terms of the difference between the 
levels of armaments). 
The solution of such a system of equations is in the form of two 
'trajectories', that is, the time courses of the armament budgets of the 
two states. These trajectories are essentially expressions for the military 
budgets as mathematical functions of time. A trajectory of the combined 
military budgets of the two blocs derived from Richardson's model was 
compared with the actual course of the combined budgets of the Entente 
and the Central Powers in the period 1908-14. The agreement between 
the predicted (actually 'post-dicted') and the actually observed course was 
almost perfect. 
Here, then, are two examples of a 'transplant operation'. The 'heart' of 
mathematicized science (the hypothetico-deductive method) was trans- 
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planted into social science. Will the transplant 'take' or will it be 'rejected'? 
Let us examine some pros and cons, taking the criticisms first. 
(1) It is maintained that mathematical models are useless in social 
science because they are too simple to capture the intricacies of human 
motivation and behavior. 
It is certainly true that mathematical models are extremely drastic 
simplifications of reality; but this property is not confined to mathematical 
models of human behavior. The mathematical theories used in the physi- 
cal sciences are also often gross simplifications; nevertheless the success of 
mathematical theories in the physical sciences cannot be disputed. 
(2) It is maintained that mathematical models seldom come to grips 
with the essential determinants of human behavior, in particular social 
processes. Some have argued, for example, that the arms race of 1908-14 
was only a symptom of the rising tensions in Europe; that the real causes 
of the war should be sought in national rivalries, old grievances, economic 
interests, intrigue in the chancelleries, etc. Similarly, the game-theoretic 
model of 'political migrations' seems fatuous. Changes of political affilia- 
tion, it is said, are consequences of ideological considerations, possibly of 
the formation and dissolution of personal contacts, behind-the-scenes 
bargains among politicians, etc. 
Again there is no denying that all of these matters play a role. But just 
listing them gives us at best a 'feeling of recognition'; it does not help 
build a systematic science. It must be kept in mind that a model, even 
though it may have explanatory power, is not an 'explanation'. It is 
rather a question put to nature of the following sort: Is an observed 
phenomenon a strict logical consequence of this particular hypothesis? If  
the answer is no, the hypothesis must be discarded; it does not qualify as 
an explanation. If  the answer is yes (with a reasonable degree of certainty), 
the hypothesis may be an explanation of the phenomenon. The corrobora- 
tion of a hypothesis does not prove it to be true and does not establish it 
as the explanation. Rather it tends to open up further questions to be in- 
vestigated in a similar manner; and this permits the building up of a 
systematic science. 
(3) Mathematics is precise and definitive. Predictions of human be- 
havior derived from mathematical formulae imply the assumption that 
human behavior is determined, whereas it is often a consequence of free 
choice, which is by definition unpredictable. 
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This argument is metaphysical and so beyond the scope of scientific 
discussion. Besides, it manifests a misconception of mathematics. Mathe- 
matical prediction can be probabilistic as well as deterministic. Also there 
is good evidence that, although the individual may exercise 'free will', 
large masses of individuals (with which social science is typically con- 
cerned) often exhibit impressive regularity in their behavior. If this were 
not the case, insurance companies, traffic control systems, and businesses 
dependent on more or less stable markets could not operate. Actually, 
even the practically perfect determinism of physical laws is now known to 
be a consequence of the fact that gross bodies (to which classical physical 
laws apply) are immensely large aggregates of particles which individually 
are not subject to the same (deterministic) laws. 
Even on the metaphysical level, the reality of 'free will' is open to 
question. There is much wisdom in Schopenhauer's remark "Man can do 
what he will, but he cannot will what he will." Freud's more recent 
exploration of this theme should not be ignored. 
So much for the arguments that, in my opinion, can be easily refuted. 
The really serious arguments against 'hardening' the social sciences 
are of a different sort. 
In selecting a research problem to be treated by 'hard', especially 
mathematical, methods, the social scientist is naturally motivated to 
choose tractable problems; that is, those that lend themselves to precise 
formulation, in particular to mathematization. Now, the physical sciences 
owe their success to the circumstance that the tractable problems were 
also the fundamental problems. The simplest physical experiments (mea- 
suring velocities of falling bodies, the expansion of a heated gas, the 
deflection of a magnetic needle in the presence of a current, the course of 
a simple chemical reaction) revealed the fundamental laws governing the 
behavior of inert matter. On this foundation the entire edifice of physical 
science was systematically constructed. These simple but fundamental 
experiments do not seem to have analogues in the realm of human be- 
havior. Psychophysics (the 'hardest' part of psychology, where simple 
definitive experiments can be performed and good mathematical theories 
can be used) has so far told us next to nothing about the human psyche. 
Small group behavior (which in certain of its aspects can be investigated 
by 'hard' methods) has so far told us very little about the nature of social 
classes, political systems, or international relations. As for mass behavior, 
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'hard' methods can be applied quite easily in this area (because of the 
relatively deterministic behavior of large aggregates). But the more trac- 
table problems are of questionable relevance to what the critics of posi- 
tivism consider to be of fundamental importance in social science. 
C. Wright Mills was especially severe in his criticism of American 
sociology (in which he could have included political science). Although 
Mills' critique was directed more at empirical sociologists than at model 
builders, it applies to the latter as well, because the sort of data which 
are likely to be of immediate use in tractable, testable models would also 
likely be of the sort that Mills considered trivial. In Mills' view, sociology 
became trivialized because sociologists abandoned substantive sociologi- 
cal theory in favor of indiscriminate data collection and routine statistical 
testing of arbitrarily chosen, disconnected 'hypotheses', that is, essentially 
'crank-turning' research. Worse, Mills believed that American sociologists, 
because of pressures of conformity acting on them, were deliberately or 
unconsciously avoiding the really important sociological problems, such 
as the investigation of power relations in American society. 
Implied in Mills' criticism is an attack on pseudo-objectivity in social 
science. Objectivity is, of course, essential in the pursuit of any scientific 
investigation. By definition, such an investigation must be directed toward 
the discovery of truth and toward accepting whatever truth may be 
discovered regardless of whether it is palatable or bitter and whether it fits 
or does not fit into our pre-conceptions. However, this stance can be 
assumed only after a problem has been selected and formulated. There 
can be no objectivity in selecting a course of investigation. Such choice 
must necessarily be guided by one's interests and one's estimates of the 
'payoffs' to be gained from the solution of the problem. (The payoffs need 
not, of course, be material gains. They can be status awards, or, in a purely 
scientific context, advances in a particular field.) Pseudo-objectivity, then, 
is an attitude that denies the importance of these subjective factors in the 
choice of problems for investigation. In particular, the pressures to select 
problems that can be solved by routine procedures (and those that do not 
come to grips with sensitive issues) are not recognized, and social science 
drifts along lines of least resistance, both methodologically and politically. 
The danger, then, is that routine, massive reliance on quantitative 
methods makes for mediocrity in social science, regardless of how sophis- 
ticated the methods may be and how meticulous may be the observations 
E X P L A N A T O R Y  P O W E R  A N D  A P P E A L  OF T H E O R I E S  337 
and the data processing. The humanistic social scientists seem to feel this 
strongly, and they see their role as that of counter-acting this tendency by 
developing 'insight theories' aimed at providing enlightenment instead of 
exercise in the use of manipulative techniques. 
In my opinion, neither the hard-liners nor the soft-liners have a 
monopoly on mediocrity; nor do the ones or the other have a monopoly 
on creativity. Ideally, speculative concept-generating theories and ri- 
gorous, technically competent hypothesis-testing theories should com- 
plement each other in the development of social science. I do not join the 
positivists who demand that every theory must be immediately transla- 
table into testable hypotheses, and that every hypothesis is formulated 
only to be tested and discarded if found wanting. This would be like 
demanding that all commercial transactions be conducted on a strict 
cash basis (actually gold, to pursue the analogy to its conclusion). Con- 
cept-generating theories are essential in social science, because social 
science simply does not have a catalogue of ready-made concepts with 
which the physical scientist operates in full confidence that his concepts 
reflect the essential features of the world with which he is concerned. 
A moratorium on concept-generating speculation would leave us stuck 
with the concepts we have; and it is highly unlikely that the most sophis- 
ticated mathematical techniques would get us much farther if the models 
to which they were applied were built from the same old concepts. 
Speculative theories, therefore, ought to provide the raw materials for the 
'hard' scientist to operationalize and to use in building theories with 
explanatory power in the hard sense. 
The concepts of political science are of crucial importance in this 
regard. Today we find political scientists working in advisory capacities in 
institutions where decisions are made affecting the lives (and deaths) of 
millions of people over the face of the globe. Indeed, the life of mankind 
itself may depend on these decisions. The advisors, consultants, and 
'intellectuals-in-residence' are expected by those who hire them to assume 
a stance of 'realism'. Unfortunately, this stance is all too often tacitly 
identified with conventional wisdom, especially in the conceptualization 
of international relations. 
I am totallyin accord with Mills' critique of American sociology (and by 
implication of American political science). The issue, however, as I see it, 
is not between the hard-liners and the soft-liners, or between theoreticians 
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and empiricists, but rather between those who coast along and those who 
actively seek new conceptualizations. The crucial difference between 
natural and social sciences must be constantly kept in mind. In the former, 
how we conceptualize the world makes a difference in what we can learn 
about the world but does not directly affect the object of our investiga- 
tion. In the social sciences, on the contrary, the object of study is our- 
selves. A change in our conceptions changes us, the objects of investiga- 
tion. Hence, when a political scientist, while admitting that the realpolitik 
conception of international relations is regrettable, nevertheless accepts it, 
because, he says, he must see the world 'objectively, as it is', he states only 
a part of the truth. He omits the important part, namely that believing 
realpolitik to be the content of international relations makes it so. This 
idea is hard to accept, because the success of science has so far depended 
on the separation of fact from value, belief, and pre-conception. Our 
values, beliefs, and pre-conceptions, however, are the facts of our social 
life. 
At the present time, the United States is seen by at least one half the 
people on this planet as a formidable obstacle to their aspirations, at times 
a threat to their very existence. No doubt, this is a feeling engendered by 
their conceptions of the United States and of its intentions. It is equally 
true that most people in the United States consider at least one third of the 
world and the ideas prevailing therein as a threat to their aspirations, at 
times to their existence. This feeling is also engendered in the conceptions 
of history, of man, and of society prevailing in the United States. It makes 
no sense to ask whether the threats are 'real'. Perceptions of threats make 
them real. The more 'real' they become the more 'realistic' becomes the 
stance which takes them into account. And since a 'realistic' foreign 
policy (at least as the United States power elite perceives it) equates the 
security of a nation with a preponderance of destructive power and with 
being willing, able, and ready to use it, the perception generates its own 
reality. The United States really becomes a threat to humanity. 
The self-realizing nature of threats has been talked about so much 
(among others, by professional civilian and military strategists) that to 
bring up the subject is only to belabor the obvious. Nevertheless, the bal- 
ance of terror persists, and in the last six years has already erupted into 
mass murder. Every one recognizes the threat inherent in the combination 
of Clausewitzian perception of international relations and nuclear capa- 
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bilities, but few social scientists and fewer political scientists do anything 
about it. 
Where then shall we look for a source of a radical change in our per- 
ceptions? I think that concept-generating theories with high explanatory 
appeal can make a significant contribution. Here is where the humanist 
social scientist can regain the stature of which the onslaughts of the 
positivists have all but deprived him. From what has been said, it should 
be clear that social science theories with only explanatory appeal (unlike 
physical science theories of this sort) are not necessarily vacuous. They 
are vacuous only if they are no more than re-runs of old mental images. 
But if they generate new images of the world, they can contribute mightily 
to the remaking of man-in-society, because man-in-society is, after all, a 
composite of beliefs. 
At the same time, the dangers inherent in theories with purely ex- 
planatory appeal should not be minimized. Paranoid delusions have a 
tremendous 'explanatory appeal': every event, even the most incon- 
sequential, falls into the paranoiac's pattern and so seems to have been 
expected. Thus every observation 'corroborates' the theory. Examples of 
this pathological epistemology can be found everywhere, in demagogic 
politics as well as in caricatures of psychoanalysis. 
To guard against 'paranoid degeneration' of theories with large ex- 
planatory appeal, the social scientist must arm himself with 'hard' 
methods. Still, the present weakness of these methods in the social sciences 
cannot be denied, therefore they must be nurtured. They should not be 
abandoned just because they have not yet paid off in predictions, the legal 
tender of 'hard' research. Specifically, the mathematical model in social 
science should be valued for having 'broken ground' and for its concept- 
generating potential. 
To illustrate, let me return to the two examples discussed above. 
Recall that when I mentioned the good agreement between Richardson's 
'trajectory' of the 1908-14 arms race and the observed course of the mili- 
tary budgets, I did not say that the model had high explanatory power on 
that account. In fact, the explanatory power of Richardson's modelis quite 
low. The reason is that the solution of Richardson's equations involves two 
free parameters, to which numerical values must be assigned before the 
derived trajectory can be compared with actual observations. The number 
of 'points' on the trajectory fitted to observations was only four. Had the 
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number of free parameters been equal to the number of points, the model 
would have no explanatory power at all, since in that case any set of data 
could be made to agree with the trajectory by assigning proper values to 
the parameters, and the model would be irrefutable. (In 'hard' science an 
irrefutable theory is worthless.) The low explanatory power of 
Richardson's model together with the almost embarrassingly drastic 
simplifications on which it is based makes the underlying theory of very 
questionable value to the political scientist seeking to discover the 'true' 
causes of World War I or, more generally, the dynamics of early twentieth 
century international relations. 
What has been left out, however, is the concept-generating potential 
of Richardson's model. The 'trajectory' is by no means its most important 
output. The point is that Richardson's equations are of a type which 
characterize both stable and unstable physical systems. Indeed, one of 
Richardson's conclusions was that if the parameters of mutual stimulation 
and self-inhibition had been assigned different values, the resulting model 
would have predicted not an escalation but a stabilization of the arms 
race. Nor is this all. With the same values of the parameters but with 
different initial conditions, the 'system' (which turned out to be an unstable 
one) would have gone at an accelerated pace in the opposite direction; 
that is, toward disarmament and increasing cooperation, perhaps a 
United Europe, instead of toward war. In Richardson's model, inter-bloc 
trade volumes enter as 'negative hostility'. Examining the actual arms 
budgets and trade volumes at the start of the arms race in 1908, Richardson 
concluded purely formally (i.e., as a consequence of the model) that if the 
inter-bloc trade volume at that time had been just five million pounds 
sterling larger (or, correspondingly, the arms budgets that much smaller), 
the system would be below the ignition threshold and the trend would have 
been reversed. 
I would not ask any one to take this conclusion seriously. I would, 
however, suggest that it is food for thought. There may be situations in 
international politics which are stable or unstable depending on the values 
of certain parameters. The idea has already motivated students of inter- 
national relations to try to discover such parameters. The international 
system may be driven by forces impervious to decisions made presumably 
on the basis of 'rational calculations'. It may be worthwhile to inquire 
into the nature of such forces. The model calls our attention to these 
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possibilities. It illustrates how a miniature system with some of the charac- 
teristics of the international system behaves; and it stimulates thought 
along paths far removed from conventional wisdom. 
Similar remarks apply to Riker's model. Its explanatory power is even 
smaller than Richardson's, since one of the hypotheses was actually 
discorroborated. However, the model is thought-provoking. To what 
extent is the behavior of modern politicians governed by ideological 
considerations and to what extent by pure power considerations? Most 
people agree that politics has become progressively less ideological and 
more like a game played by professionals for concrete stakes (patronage, 
advancement along the political ladder, etc.). This theory has explanatory 
appeal (it agrees, for example, with our impressions about American 
politics). But how can one 'capture' this idea so as to formulate specific 
hypotheses to be corroborated or refuted? How can one separate ideologi- 
cal from power components as determinants of political behavior? The 
mathematical model requires the theoretician to use observable indices, 
and brings the apparatus of mathematical reasoning to bear on logical 
deduction. It helps to clarify thinking. Thus Riker's model of how French 
politicians are supposed to behave is not to be taken seriously as a theory 
of how they actually behave. The model is essentially an exercise, an 
'etude', if you will. Its most valuable result is that it accustoms us to the 
techniques, reveals to us their potentialities and weaknesses, suggests 
other approaches; in short, lights the way in our search for new con- 
ceptualizations of social behavior. The model, like most of the still 
primitive mathematical models in social science, has heuristic value. 
It will be a long time before we can look to the social sciences for the 
sort of knowledge about ourselves that the natural sciences have provided 
us about the world outside of ourselves. Indeed, we may never obtain 
it. We must constantly keep in mind, however, that the most valuable by- 
product of social science may not be 'objective knowledge' (which has been 
traditionally thought to be the principal product of pure science), much 
less the 'power to control' (which has been the principal product of applied 
science), but rather the transformation of ourselves through a persistent 
search for self-knowledge. To the seeker of self-knowledge, rewards accrue 
even if he never reaches the goal. 
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